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1. Introduction          
We present a case study on contracts in pepper production (peper nigrum L.) in Costa Rica. There are no 
spot markets for pepper in Costa Rica and only one single processor buys fresh pepper from producers and 
thereby selects only bunches with the best quality. Most farmers deliver pepper individually to the 
processor. In this monopsonic market, rejection rates average 10% of each delivery, which results in 
important income losses for farmers. Pepper is rejected when it has been damaged during transport or it 
was picked in an immature state. Farmers are in a weak position to negotiate and the rates of rejection are 
a source of distrust between the farmers and the processor. In response, farmers from the settlement El 
Roble started to organize pepper selection and transport themselves, and bulk the pepper transactions into 
a single group contract. The activities of the association have the dual aim of reducing rejection rates and 
increasing the bargaining power in price negotiations, i.e. negotiation of a group contract.  
Mainstream economics predicts that the buyer of pepper  would resist the initiation of an 
association as it limits its influence on the pepper price. In an economy where transaction costs are 
ignored, a monopsonic firm would have full power to dictate price and quantity to maximise profits 
depending on its own cost structure and marginal product. In a group contract arrangement the firm could 
loose these prerogatives because the new market arrangement has the characteristics of a bilateral 
monopoly. Yet, on the other hand, individual contracts are expensive to implement. Comparable to a spot 
market, individual con tracts give rise to high search, monitoring and enforcement costs which make the 
contracts ‘costly, cumbersome, time-consuming and unpredictable’ (Fafchamps, 2004). The level of these 
transaction costs are determined by uncertainty (positive) and frequency (negative) of the transaction and 
the degree of specific investment involved (positive) (Williamson in Ménard, 2005).   
The uncertainty in the trade of fresh  pepper is important since it is a perishable product with 
variable quality. Two important sources of uncertainty are opportunistic behaviour of both produ cers and 
firm, and bounded rationality. Opportunistic behaviour refers to the possibility of agents to act out of self-
interest. Bounded rationality refers to the physically-limited capacity of agents to evaluate accurately all 
potential gains and losses from a given market decision, like a contractual choice (Simon, 1961). Due to 
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bounded rationality complete contracts do not exist; this usually encourages agents to act  opportunistically 
and to take advantage of any situation that has not been specified in the contract. The producers will try to 
maximize their sales and thereby offer all pepper harvested, disregarding the quality levels. Furthermore, 
farmers are found to easily breach individual con tracts. Enforcement is problematic as the contracts are 
informal and small in quantity and therefore beyond the r each of the law. Moreover, even if the producers 
would be prosecuted for breaching a contract, they have little assets that could be seized (cf. contracts by 
African traders in Fafchamps (2004)). The frequency of transaction is high because pepper is harvested 
throughout the year and sales are organised every two weeks. During the low production season, the 
frequency of transaction may drop to one delivery per three weeks. This would indicate that reputation is 
important. Finally, asset specificity1 is high for bo th producers and processors. This specificity usually 
affects the balance of bargaining power between the processor and smallholders, and makes a processor 
often less interested to be integrated with the production side.  
Williamson (1991) explained how trading agents search for  the best mode of governance that fits 
the characteristics of the transaction in order to minimize transaction costs. We argue that the group 
contract results in economics of scale for contracting and other transaction costs as well as the 
improvement of product coordination to ensure a regular provision of fresh pepper with the desired quality 
characteristics (Singh, 2000; Glover 1987). A group con tract is considered as a hybrid governance 
arrangement that reduces transaction costs (Ménard, 2004; Allen and Lueck, 2005; Ménard, 2005). 
Efficiency gains from a group contract can also be explained from an agency theory view. A group 
contract is considered as a more efficient way to govern the relationship between the principal (i.e. 
processor) and the agents (i.e. producers ind ividually and/or as a farmers’ association), because it reduces 
the conflicts of self-interest between the principal and the agent(s). Next to scale economies in contracting 
costs, it is assumed that a group contract overcomes the agency problem that results from the opportunistic 
behaviour of both regarding the quality and rejection of fresh pepper (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, a group 
                                                   
1 Asset specificity means high specialization of investments for a near unique commercial purpose (Williamson, 
1991; Hobbs, 1996; Key and Runsten, 1999). 
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contract may limit the effects of the skewed bargaining power that results from the monopsonic market 
power of the processor (cf. cooperatives that have contractual purposes to deal with perceived market 
failures (Cook, 1995)), and bargaining cooperatives described by Knoeber (1983) as collective 
organizations to contract with processors for the sale of members’ crops). Furthermore, the farmers’ 
association may have external economies, also described as passive co llective efficiency (Nadvi in 
McDormick (1999)) such as improved access to market information and labour poo ling in sorting, 
packaging, supervision and transport. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that we can find conditions for which the incomes of 
the monopsonic processing firm and the farmers’ association are jointly maximized by a group contract. 
The focus of the study is on farmers from the El Roble peasant settlement, because they started a 
producers’ organization in response to a monopsonistic market. We identified 19 members at the time of 
the research. Based on survey information of these farmers, we developed  a model to calculate the 
benefits from behaviour and contract choices.  
This study is innovative in the calculation of the results in price and income from firm and 
farmers’ behaviour. The model is built on real data concerning production and marketing costs. Following 
this introduction, we give the specifications of our op timisation model, followed by a description of the 
main outcomes in section three. We conclude in section four.  
 
2. Mode l specification 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
A non-linear integer simulation model was set-up to assess the contractual agreement that maximizes the 
processor’s and farmers’ gross income. The model is adapted from Dorward (2001). The sum of the gross 
incomes2 of the farmers and processor is maximized, taking into account their relative market power and 
                                                   
 
2 Gross income is defined as value of sales less value of variable and fixed costs, not including labor, capital and land 
costs. 
  
 5 
risk preferences. In the model individual farmers (sellers) sell pepper to one single monopsonic processor 
(buyer). Mature pepper plants are harvested throughout the year, yet with a clear harvesting peak resulting 
in two marketing seasons (s): low-supply (March to November) and high supply (December to February). 
The contractual forms (k ) are individual contracts (IC) and group contracts (GC). The processor and 
farmers may behave low or high opportunistically (j) to which probabilities of occurrence and expected 
losses are associated. It is assumed for a given party, that high probabilities are attributed to other party’s 
high opportunistic behaviour in individual contracts, and high probabilities to low opportunistic behaviour 
of the other party in group contracts. It is expected that rejection rates and supervision costs are highest 
under h igh opportunistic behaviour of farmer and processor. We also assume that the firm’s production 
costs are lower under group contracts as the fresh pepper is of better quality, with the lowest costs when 
opportunistic behaviour is low. 
 The model calculates the income levels of farm and firm with the quantity transacted and price of 
fresh pepper as endogenous variables in the model. The incomes should at least be equal than a 
reservation income that firm and  farmers could gain in alternative activities. Furthermore, risk behaviour 
is modelled using a Target MOTAD approach (Tauer, 1983). In such model, income deviations below a 
target income should be smaller than parameters (‘lambdas’) for farmers and firm which reflect their 
respective risk aversion. Low levels of both lambdas indicate that buyer or seller is risk averse regarding 
such income deviations. 
 When individual contracts are set up, monopsonistic market conditions prevail as the firm (buyer) 
has full market power, i.e. he can set the buying price for fresh pepper according to the value of its 
marginal product (Henderson & Quand t, 1980). In the case of collective action, a bilateral monopoly 
emerges, i.e. one buyer and one group of  sellers. It is useful to consider three sub-cases, as the price of 
pepper will be the result of negotiations between the buyer and the seller. The three cases are two limiting 
cases; a monopoly where the farmers’ group would have all market power and a monopsony (buyer firm 
has all market power), and an in-between case of joint profit maximization (Henderson & Quandt, 1980) 
as a possible, but not necessary outcome, of a negotiation process.   
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2.2 Data  
The model uses data from a previous research in markets and contracts for smallholder pepper producers 
in Costa Rica (Ruben and Sáenz, forthcoming). Data were gathered in 2000 and 2001 from farmers’ 
surveys and in-depth interviews with processors and employees of involved governmental institutions. 
Because the identity and number of the producers were unknown at the beginning of the research, we 
implemented a non-random sampling method, called ‘snow ball’ method (Babbie 1992)3. We chose the El 
Roble settlement because it is oldest as a pepper producing area and the main producing area in Costa Rica 
in 2000. It has the most skilled pepper producers and is the only area with a producers’ organization. 
 The selected 19 producers from El Roble settlement devote on average 1.32 manzanas (mz)4 to 
pepper, which is on  average 4.5% of their available land. Further increase in the area of pepper would 
depend on labor availability, available capital for investment and the farmers’ conf idence in the market 
conditions. These producers have add itional income sources apart from pepper with 58% (or 11 cases) 
reporting that less than 40% of their income is earned from pepper. Other income sources include animal 
husbandry and non-agricultural activities. 
2.3 Model specifications  
In the model, we consider two market conditions (s): low and high supply seasons; two contract 
arrangements (k): individual and  group contracts (IC and GC, respectively); and the parties may display a 
low or high opportunistic behaviour (j) (low-opp and high-opp, respectively). Model specification is as 
follows: 
 
 Objective function: 
å å -+=
kjs kjs
kjskjskjkjskjskj psSwpbBwAMax )1(       (1) 
                                                   
3 We identified 75 active pepper producers and successfully interviewed 65, of which 19  from El Roble settlement.  
4 1 manzana equals 7.000 m2 or 0.7 ha.  
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In the objective function (1), the sum of the gross income of processor  and farmers is maximized. This is 
expressed as the expected income of processor (B) and farmers (S) multiplied by their bargaining power. 
The w is defined as a measure of bargaining power of  the processor with respect to the farmers with a 
value ranging from 0 to 1 (0 ≤ w ≤ 1). If w = 0 farmers take all the gains and if w = 1 the processor obtains 
all benefits, subject to minimum income requirements and risk considerations of the other party. We 
consider for  the IC that w=1 in all cases. As explained above, we distinguish three market conditions for 
the GC namely, monopoly (w=0), monop sony (w=1) and joint profit maximization (w=0.5). The variables 
pbkjs and p skjs measure the probability for a given party (processor or farmers) of other party’s 
opportunistic behaviour (j), under contractual arrangement (k) and market condition (s). Probabilities sum 
one for each market condition (s). The probability for farmers behaving opportunistically is higher when 
the processor chooses individual contracts and lower when group contracts are chosen. The probability for 
the processor behaving oppo rtunistically is higher when farmers choose individual contracts and lower 
when they choose group contracts. 
Equations (2) and (3) show the endogenous determined income of the processor and farmers, 
respectively, under contractual arrangement (k), opportunistic behaviour (j) and season (s) , by taking into 
account:  
1 Xkjs: the endogenously determined volume of fresh pepper traded; 
 
2 Rejection rate which is defined at four levels as follows: 9% (IC and low-opp), 15% (IC and high-
opp), 1% (GC and low-opp), and 5% (GC and high-opp); 
3 indy: the industrial yield and is defined by the processor as 4.20 kg of fresh pepper to produce 1 kg of 
processed white pepper; 
4 frpks: processor’s pr ice for white pepper, equal to $8 per kg. This is the highest selling price reported 
by the processor in 2000. Selling prices may vary every semester, according to negotiations with the 
processor’s main client (a North American food processor based in Costa Rica). This niche market 
arrangement is relatively isolated from the world pepper market; 
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5 Fkjs: Purchase price of fresh pepper for the processor and the farmers is determined endogenously in 
the model; premiumk is a quality premium paid as an incentive for good quality pepper in the group 
contract;  
6 fpckjs and p pcks: the production costs f or the processor and the farmers, respectively. The processor 
reported different production costs per kg of white pepper under k and j. The farmers surv ey estimated 
the average production costs at $0.17 per kg of fresh pepper; 
7 fgks, ftks, pgks, ptks, ptsks and pmfk: organization costs when individual and group contracts are chosen; 
fgks and f tks are the coordination and transport costs for the processor per kg of fresh pepper under k 
and s; pgkjs is the cost for farmers to organize supervision at the collection point, estimated at $0.107 
per kg of fresh pepper for the supervision by 3 people during 3 hours at each delivery in low supply 
season; and $0.025 per kg for supervision by 3 people during 6 hours at each  delivery in high supply 
season; ptkjs is the cost of transportation fr om El Roble to the processor’s processing facility and is 
estimated at $0.0204 per kg of fresh pepper in a 2.5 ton truck; ptskjs are the costs of supervising the 
transportation, estimated at $0.024 per kg of fresh, given a processor’s low opportunistic behaviour; 
and $0.0032 per kg under processor’s high opportunistic behaviour5,6. pmfk introduces a membership 
fee when group con tracts are chosen;  
8 ffks and p fks: fixed costs for the processor and the farmers when they trade pepper respectively. For the 
farmers this is the minimal cost of delivering and referring to the value  of working time and the time 
needed for delivery at the collection point. For the processor we consider half of the monthly 
administrative costs for the management for processing pepper. 
Equations (4) and (5) express th at the expected gross income of processor and farmers should be larger 
than a reservation income which is equal to what they could have earned in an alternative activity in both 
                                                   
5 We estimated the cost of one person travelling in the truck on every delivering, spending six hours for the trip and 
supervision at the processor’s facility gate under processor’s low opportunistic behaviour, and eight hours under 
processor’s high opportunistic behaviour. 
6 Governance and transport supervision costs are calculated taking into account the minimum labour cost for an 
agricultural worker, which was about US$1 per hour at the time of this research.  
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seasons of the year. For the processor (rb) this is defined as half of the target income, namely (US) 
$19,400, equally divided over each season. For the farmers (r s) it is defined as the average income 
obtained from o ther agricultural activities (commercial crops, livestock production and off -farm 
employment) amounting to $17,570, divided over the two seasons.  
The variables Zb-kjs and Zs -kjs in equations (6) to (9) determine the value of the deviation in income 
below the target income. The expected shortfall from the target is calculated. The satisfactory level of 
shortfall from target is given by 㮰buyer and 㮰 seller for the processor and farmers respectively. These variables 
are introduced to let the model account for risk behaviou r. For the processor, the target income (b*) is set 
at $38,000 in the base run, which is the annual fixed costs to operate the plant processing pepper. For the 
farmers’ group, target income (s*) is the lowest income they repo rted to be willing to accept before 
quitting to produce pepper, calculated at $27,412 per year from survey data  
Equation (10) refers to the limitations in production, namely that the amount of fresh pepper 
traded in a season should be lower than a maximum of what is transacted per season (30,000 kg, the 
production in 2000) multiplied by a capacity factor (cap) to allow for production increases. 
 Finally, constraints (11) and (12) are added to make the model integer, so that only one contract 
arrangement per season is selected. Thus, the model does not foresee the scenario where farmers trade part 
of the produce individually and the rest in a group contract. This set of equations was programmed in 
GAMS. The results are shown and discussed in the next section.  
 
3. Results  
As mentioned above, the model is run under three distinct market forms in group contract ((A) a 
monopsony of the processor; (B) joint profit maximisation between the processor and the farmers’ 
association; and (C) a monopo ly of farmers’ association) by setting the parameter for market power (w) at 
values 1, 0.5 and 0, respectively (see section 2.3). In case of individual contracts, a monopsonistic 
situation prevails and the firm holds all bargaining power.  
In all runs, a maximal amount of 60,000 kg of fresh pepper will be transacted for each season. 
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Table 1 shows the endogenously-calculated price at which fresh pepper is traded and the contract choice 
for the three runs. All prices are above the minimum price accepted by the producers, before they shift 
from pepper to ano ther economic activity. At the time of research, the reported minimum price was on 
average $0.523/ kg of fresh pepper.  
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
Table 2 shows the income levels that would be reached if the firm and farmers opt for the contract 
structure as proposed by the model above. It is clear that the firms’ gains are the highest when it has a 
monopsonistic power and lowest in a monopo ly situation, while for farmers is the oppo site situation.  
 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
The model predicts that, given the parameters defined above, bo th firm and farmers as a group could 
benefit from developing a group contract in the limited cases, runs of monopsony (A) and monopoly (C). 
Although in a monopsony the processor has the bargaining power to keep the price of the fresh pepper 
low, the model, nevertheless, predicts that the gross income of the processor is maximized when the fresh 
pepper is procured in a group contract instead of a multiple set of smaller individual contracts.  
In the other extreme case (C), when farmers are given all the bargaining power, a group contract is 
chosen at a higher selling price of pepper in both seasons. The gross income of the farmers is maximized 
at these higher pr ices. In this situation the costs of organizing a farmers’ association and the costs to 
organise a group contract are lower than the benefits (mainly a lower rejection rate).  
Limited case runs of monopsony (A) and monopoly (C) show the same outcome, namely that 
group contracts with low opportun istic behaviour yield the highest gross incomes for the firm and the 
farmers. The highest income levels for the firm and the lowest for the farmers are reached in the 
monopsony run (A), while the opposite is shown in a monopoly (C).   
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 In the joint profit maximization run (B) it seems more rewarding for the processor to procure 
pepper in a group contract during the high season (at a price which is little higher than in monopsonistic 
run), and in individual contracts during the low season. In the latter case, the model predicts that the most 
optimal situation is reached at lower procurement prices than those paid in group contracts, and therefore 
being more favourable for the firm. The price paid to the farmers would be $0.681/kg of fresh pepper, 
above the average minimum price accepted by the farmers ($0.523/kg of fresh pepper) . The model shows 
that the gains for the firm to organise a group contract (lower contract and transaction costs)  are foregone 
by the loss in bargaining power which would result in a higher input price. The firm has enough 
bargaining power in the model to shift the contract choice into its favour.  
The firm can maximize its income by acting opportunistically and exerting its monopsonic power 
in individual contracts. Yet it does so by paying a price which guarantees the farmers a minimal income, 
and without taking them to the point that they shift from pepper to another econom ic activity. The rational 
behind this opportunistic behaviour can be explained by the combined effects of the uncertainty of a 
constant flow of inputs and by the low frequency of transaction. As explained in the introduction, both 
uncertainty and frequency of transaction are determinants of transaction costs; and the level of transaction 
costs characterise to a large extend the governance structure between trading parties (Williamson, 2003).  
The firm invested significantly in specific assets, more in particular in a processing plant and 
personnel, and it depends on farmers’ loyalty, providing a constant flow of fresh pepper. During the low 
production season, however, the delivery of fresh pepper is more irregular (every 2 to 3 weeks instead of 
the weekly supply during the high season). In this case the firm may not run the risk that farmers refuse 
harvesting pepper and turn to other activities, which explains why the price of pepper reaches acceptable 
levels for the individual farmers. Farmers have some room for n egotiation. Yet, it may not convince them 
to form an association and bulk the produce. The model shows that the gains for the firm of a lower 
procurement pr ice are more important than the potential gains for the farmers of  a higher selling price and 
a decrease of transaction costs. The transaction costs are high due the less frequent deliveries in  the low 
season which encourages the agen ts to behave opportunistically. The reduction of these transaction costs 
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that would result from a group contract is not sufficient to conduce to a collective action.   
Conversely, the model predicts a group contract during the high season. This finding is in line 
with theory, namely that as the frequency of transaction increases, the risk on opportunistic behaviour 
decreases (Hobbs, 1996). Stable relationships are more easily maintained with high repeated transactions, 
where agents are able to build up reputation, loyalty and confidence. Or in other words, it is worthwhile 
for the firm to enter into a group contract in order to economize on transaction costs.  
One could argue that a similar reasoning applies to the low supply market situation in the first 
scenario (A), as the firm faces similar low supp ly and uncertainty. Yet in the monopsonistic situation the 
objective function maximises the gross income of the firm as a sum of the returns in the low and high 
season. The income of the farmers is not considered, as we assume that they have no o r very little 
bargaining power (although the firm seeks the farmers’ loyalty, see above).  In this case the firm exerts it 
bargaining power to conclude a group contract in the high supp ly season at a lower price of fresh pepper 
than in the low supply season.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The analysis demonstrates that under certain conditions the incomes of the monopsonic processing firm 
and the farmers’ association are jointly maximized by a group contract, characterized by low opportunistic 
behaviour from both agents. The model shows that the firm is better off dealing with a group contract 
instead of a multiple set of smaller individual contracts while showing a low oppo rtunistic behaviour; also 
in the monopsonistic market situation. 
Runs (A) and (C) are limiting solutions. In the former case we would not expect a processor to 
behave as a total monopsonist. According to Key and Runsten (1999), if a monopsonic firm exerts all its 
bargaining power for its own benefit, it faces uncertainty regarding farmers’ response, which is costly to 
monitor. Although farmers tend to be loyal to the processor, even if their negotiation power is limited, 
they might be forced out of pepper production if the price is found too low. They would earn a better 
living in alternative activities. This would be critical to the firm as it needs a continuous and stable flow to 
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operate and remit its investments. Regarding run (C) , pepper producers can form (and are forming) an 
organization in order to face the monopsony. However, they are very far  from exerting a full monopolistic 
power due to their socio-economic limitations. Hence, we conclude that joint pro fit maximization run (B) 
is the most plausible solution for this case. The results of the model in run B have shown that the firm 
maximises its gross income in individual contracts; yet, it may not take the farmers for granted and pay 
them an unacceptable low price. This could further contribute to the farmers’ loyalty (Key and Runsten, 
1999). 
 The latter outcome is important in the sense that collective action might be needed only under 
certain market conditions, but no t all the time. Given the importance of contract farming and collective 
actions as strong mechanisms to mitigate transaction costs, improve product coordination and bargaining 
power balance between the contracting parts, it would be expected that farmers would look for the 
implementation of such institutions all the time. However, certain changes in market conditions may 
stimulate to breach the contract and/or holding up the collective action by one or both actors (Gow et al.  
2000). In run (B) the model forecasts a breach of the group contract under low supply of fresh pepper just 
because it becomes too expensive or unattractive. However, if the production might be stable through the 
year, with a weekly supply and no season differentiation, group contracts would be chosen all the time. 
Notwithstanding, pepper production in Costa Rica is done by producers with a low technology and input 
package, and by using a strong but low-productive plant variety (Balankota). Therefore we have two 
production seasons, with unbalanced amounts of fresh pepper and irregular supply, from producers with 
different decisions on their production systems (Ruben and Sáenz, forthcoming).  
For future development of pepper production, there is a need for an increase in productivity and 
stabilization of production throughout the year, with the aim of increasing (and stabilizing) the frequency 
of transactions, to improve trust between actors, encourage low opportunistic behaviour, and, thereby, 
strengthen vertical integration between both parties. This goal would require re-converting the whole 
current production system, by progressively substituting the current pepper plants with high-productive 
varieties and increasing input use. Yet, this re-conversion may be too risky and expensive for low-
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producers. Therefore, the firm might start by helping farmers to increase produ ctivity with the current 
variety. This can be done by changing the present market specification contract for a production 
management contract; otherwise, seasonal contracts under irregular supply through the year would be still 
the best scenario. 
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Table 1. Price and governance structure in three runs 
 
Run Market form Market 
power1 
Contract 
Structure2 
Behaviour3 Price of fresh pepper 
($/kg) 
#  w   Low 
season 
High 
season 
 In case of individual contracts between one buyer and several sellers 
A Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp   
A Monopsony 1 IC High-opp   
B Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp   
B Monopsony 1 IC High-opp 0.681  
C Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp   
C Monopsony 1 IC High-opp   
 In case of a group contract between one buyer and one group of sellers 
A Monopsony 1 GC Low-opp 0.729 0.632 
A Monopsony 1 GC High-opp   
B Joint profit maximization 0.5 GC Low-opp  1.062 
B Joint profit maximization 0.5 GC High-opp   
C Monopoly 0 GC Low-opp 0.967 1.062 
C Monopoly 0 GC High-opp   
1  w=1: In case of IC, monopsony; in case of GC, monopsony as a limiting case; w=0: GC only, monopoly as a 
limiting case; w=0.5 GC only, joint profit maximization as a possible outcome of negotiation process   
2  IC: Individual contract, GC: Group contract 
3  Behaviour: Low-opp: low opportunistic behaviour of either the seller and/or the buyer  
 High-opp: high opportunistic behaviour of either the seller and/or the buyer  
 
 
Table 2. Income levels of processor and farmers in three runs  
Run Market form Market 
power1 
Contract 
Structure2 
Behaviour3 Realised income ($/year) 
#  w   Firm Farmers’ 
total 
Average 
per farmer 
 In case of individual contracts between one buyer and several sellers 
A Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp    
A Monopsony 1 IC High-opp    
B Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp    
B Monopsony 1 IC High-opp 40,618 23,502 1,237 
C Monopsony 1 IC Low-opp    
C Monopsony 1 IC High-opp    
 In case of a group contract between one buyer and one group of sellers 
A Monopsony 1 GC Low-opp 107,140 46,490 2,447 
A Monopsony 1 GC High-opp    
B Joint profit maximization 0.5 GC Low-opp 31,012 48,560 2,451 
B Joint profit maximization 0.5 GC High-opp    
C Monopoly 0 GC Low-opp 67,425 86,205 4,537 
C Monopoly 0 GC High-opp    
 Total incomes under each run 
A     107,140 46,490 2,447 
B     72,630 70,062 3,687 
C     67,425 86,205 4,537 
1, 2 and 3: see Table 1 
